Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Chicago Journal of International Law

Abstract

This article is part of a three-part series addressing the question whether the law of armed conflict, also called international humanitarian law (HL), privileges a form ofguerrilla warfare y nonstate actors that is often conducted in violation of these laws and in the process endangers civilians, in pursuit of a strategy of inviting a response from their opponents that helps them enlist additional recruits and international support. The strategy, rationalfrom the standpoint of the guerrilla forces, derogates signficanty from the law's overall objective of minimiing harm to civilian populations. The articles in this series approach this question of asymmetry by considering whether IHL in fact need or should be interpreted to privilege the guerrilla strategy. Most discussions of the laws of war focus on the limitations placed on attackers to avoid risks to civilians. The purpose of this article is to look at the issue from the standpoint of the duties of defenders to avoid such risks. Dangers to civilians during armed conflict are a joint product of both attackers and defenders, and minimiZation of such harm-presumably the overriding mission of IHL-requires establishing the right incentives for both attackers and defenders. Subsequent articles in the series will address the principle of 'roportionaity " the duty of attackers to avoid use of excessive force that may imperil civilians, even if they are not being targeted-and consider whether intentional targeting of civilians during armed conflicts by nonstate actors constitutes a war crime under IHL

First Page

425

Volume

11

Publication Date

2011

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