Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Michigan Law Review
Abstract
Part I of this article examines the reasons for preferring locationally neutral taxes and explains the basic tension between locational neutrality and state and local autonomy in taxation. Part II examines the federal judicial check on state and local taxation, which often relies on a principle barring discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce. Part III explores the need for a broad federal judicial check by examining state and local governments' reasons for imposing (or avoiding) locationally distortive taxes, the countervailing benefits of allowing such governments broad autonomy in taxation, and Congress' willingness to strike down locationally distortive taxes under its Commerce Clause powers. Part IV, the conclusion, provides specific recommendations for congressional and judicial action.
First Page
895
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2307/1289453
Volume
90
Publication Date
1992
Recommended Citation
Daniel N. Shaviro,
An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation,
90
Michigan Law Review
895
(1992).
Available at:
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-articles/1063
