Reining in the Regulators: Title VI of the Financial CHOICE Act
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Description
The drafters of the Financial CHOICE Act believe that the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandated excessive regulation of the financial sector—especially banks—and also that U.S. financial regulators have not regulated wisely: both before and since Dodd-Frank. Although other parts of the CHOICE Act target specific provisions of Dodd-Frank (e.g., Title I provides an “off-ramp” from detailed Dodd-Frank regulation for well capitalized banks), Title VI addresses broader regulatory issues. In this chapter, we will address the following: • Requiring cost-benefit analyses of all financial regulatory proposals; • Requiring that Congress approve all major financial regulations; • Eliminating the “Chevron deference” to regulatory agencies; and • Requiring multi-person governing boards instead of single-heads of agencies.
First Page
199
Source Publication
Regulating Wall Street: CHOICE Act vs. Dodd-Frank
Source Editors/Authors
Matthew P. Richardson, Kermit L. Schoenholtz, Bruce Tuckman, Lawrence J. White
Publication Date
2017
Publisher
Center for Global Economy and Business of New York University Stern School of Business
Recommended Citation
Barry E. Adler, Thomas F. Cooley & Lawrence J. White,
Reining in the Regulators: Title VI of the Financial CHOICE Act,
Regulating Wall Street: CHOICE Act vs. Dodd-Frank
199
(2017).
Available at:
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/9
