The Politics of European Federalism
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Description
The European Union (EU) is manifestly different from other international "regimes." Even if it never becomes a genuine federation, the EU is a much more powerful economic, juridical, and political entity than the myriad intergovernmental institutions that dot the international landscape. Indeed, over the course of its short history, the governing institutions of the EU have successfully claimed wider and wider jurisdictions despite the resistance of numerous actors in member states. This paper considers the development of the EU within an explicit model of federalism. We take a different perspective on the familiar terrain of institutional research on the EU—the interactions among the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Parliament. We ask how these "horizontal" facets o f European integration have affected what we call "vertical" federalism—that is, relations between the member states and "Brussels." More specifically, we consider the impact of the changes in these institutionalized interactions at the Brussels level signaled by the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht in December 1991 (the Maastricht treaty) on the support for further integration among European governments and citizens.
Source Publication
Economics of European Union Law
Source Editors/Authors
Paul B. Stephan
Publication Date
2007
Recommended Citation
Bednar, Jenna; Ferejohn, John A.; and Garrett, Geoffrey, "The Politics of European Federalism" (2007). Faculty Chapters. 526.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/526
