The Spatial Model and Elections
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Description
If it had made no other contribution to our thinking about politics, Anthony Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy would be widely and justly acclaimed for introducing and expositing the spatial theory of electoral competition. This theory not only provided the basis for the development of formal models of electoral politics-specifically for a unification of a theory of voting behavior and a theory of electoral competition within the same model-but it also transformed the way that empirical researchers and even casual observers think and talk about electoral politics. It became common to try to account for the fortunes of candidates by referring to their "locations" in an issue space relative to the distribution of voter preferences. Indeed-and this is the acid test of the acceptance of a theory-as it became clear that various of the "predictions" of the spatial theory were not actualized in data from real elections, researchers responded by trying to improve measurement and observation technology, or by refining the theory, rather than by jettisoning the spatial theory as a whole. The spatial metaphor has by now become such a common and powerful way of portraying electoral competition that students and journalists unselfconsciously depict electoral phenomena in its terms, without recognizing either its limitations or its foundational assumptions. But in his original introduction of the spatial model Downs is actually quite cautious with regard to the applicability of the spatial theory to actual elections. He spends a good deal of effort and space in his book examining the conditions under which electoral competition could be understood in the terms of the spatial model. Specifically, he tries to develop a theory in which parties compete for office by making promises and voters base their votes on a comparison of these promises. In this chapter I explore an issue that is crucial to the applicability of the spatial model of elections: the question of whether or not, within the spatial model, campaign platforms can actually have predictive or informational value for the voter. Obviously, unless platforms contain information as to what candidates would do in office, it would not be rational for voters to base their behavior on them. In this sense, the spatial model rests on the assumption that campaign platforms are useful guides to the future behavior of politicians. I show that it is by no means obvious that platforms can serve this function required of them by the spatial approach.
Source Publication
Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective
Source Editors/Authors
Bernard Grofman
Publication Date
1993
Recommended Citation
Ferejohn, John A., "The Spatial Model and Elections" (1993). Faculty Chapters. 521.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/521
