Congress and Redistribution
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Description
Legislation almost always entails some redistribution of wealth. But some proposals are justified by their sponsors primarily on the grounds of their intended effects on income distribution. Such proposals are often controversial because they entail the taking of property from some for the benefit of others; their consideration can therefore cause intense political conflict. Since the constitutional biases of the American system, with its multiplicity of decision stages, tend to work against the enactment of controversial laws, the passage of fundamental redistributive legislation occurs infrequently in American politics. Indeed, if one considers only organic acts, many of the most important redistributive programs were enacted in a few congresses of extraordinary partisan imbalance. The New Deal and Great Society congresses passed legislation authorizing social security, medical assistance to the aged, and a variety of programs of public assistance for the poor and the disabled. Although the inauguration of many of these programs was politically significant, they have grown to many times their original sizes through the actions (or at least the assent) of congresses that were not so atypical. Once previously controversial programs were established, congressional processes often turned to their routine funding and extension in circumstances that might have allowed retrenchment or even dismantling. The observer of income transfer programs in the United States is struck by two dominant conditions: First, the American system of redistribution is vast and complex. Dozens of programs exist with the purpose of transferring income or services to deserving individuals, and each is administered in some unique fashion in the federal system. Second, despite governmental activity, the effect of redistributive programs on the overall distributions of wealth and income is very limited by comparative standards. The distributions of wealth and income in this country remain highly skewed after decades of governmental involvement and show little sign of evolving in a more egalitarian direction. In this chapter I argue that the structure of American institutions, particularly congressional institutions, helps account both for the diversity of programs and for their limited aggregate effect. The logic of the explanation is based on the calculus of coalition formation imposed on political actors by the Constitution and by the institutional evolution that has proceeded from it. It is important, for the purposes of this essay, to make a distinction between the purposes of a program and the means employed to achieve them. A redistributive program or policy has as its primary purpose the alteration of some aspect of the distribution of wealth or income and employs taxing and spending to transfer wealth or income. Programs that use regulatory means to achieve ends of equity are not, in this sense, classed as redistributive even though they may appeal to the same basic values. Redistributive policies are instances of distributive ones. In particular, they are distributive policies that aim at serving values of fairness, equality, or compassion rather than, say, improving highways or limiting flood damage.
Source Publication
Making Economic Policy in Congress
Source Editors/Authors
Allen Schick
Publication Date
1983
Recommended Citation
Ferejohn, John A., "Congress and Redistribution" (1983). Faculty Chapters. 506.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/506
