On the Properties of Stable Decision Procedures
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Description
Nonunanimous voting processes seldom possess voting equilibria if the number of alternatives is large. The discovery of this fact has led to an intense search for new “solution concepts” for voting games that are capable of predicting outcomes in cases in which equilibria fail to exist. The reader is referred to papers by Kramer (1977), Fiorina and Shepsle (this volume), and Riker (this volume) for examples and further discussion.
Source Publication
Political Equilibrium
Source Editors/Authors
Peter C. Ordeshook, Kenneth A. Shepsle
Publication Date
1982
Recommended Citation
Ferejohn, John A. and Grether, David M., "On the Properties of Stable Decision Procedures" (1982). Faculty Chapters. 504.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/504
