Voting Theory, Union Elections, and the Constitution
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Description
In his paper, "Some Procedural Aspects of Majority Rule," Professor Kramer has discussed the ways in which the general notion of due process maybe applied to the rules of order used by parliamentary bodies. In the course of that paper, he has elaborated a notion of majority will that he claims has general acceptance in political theory. In this paper, which began as a comment upon his, I shall use his account of the majority will to discuss in the particular context of labor law two distinct but closely related issues. The first of these concerns the degree to which procedures adopted in certification elections—those which determine which union, if any, in a given bargaining unit should represent the workers in that unit—should conform to his account of the majority will. The second of these questions is, whether as a constitutional matter there is any violation of the due process clause when the federal government sanctions union elections that do not adopt the account of majority will that he proposes. In order to set the stage for an examination of these two issues, it is first necessary to set out in brief form the account of the majority will adopted by Kramer and the reasons why it should be preferred to other accounts that might be substituted in its place.
Source Publication
Due Process
Source Editors/Authors
J. Roland Pennock, John W. Chapman
Publication Date
1977
Recommended Citation
Epstein, Richard A., "Voting Theory, Union Elections, and the Constitution" (1977). Faculty Chapters. 421.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/421
