Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements
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Description
This article posits that the arbitral forum might be preferable to court litigation because it is considerably more accessible to workers who cannot afford or do not have claims interesting enough to attract private counsel or in many cases administrative agencies as well This article questions whether the existing justice system truly serves most employee claimants better than a private arbitration system. The author supports these claims with available empirical evidence, which establishes that arbitration is faster than litigation and that employee claimants win more frequently in arbitration, albeit receiving lower awards. The article leverages this information to support the theory that courts offer “Cadillac” justice to high-income employees with claims large enough to attract a private lawyer. The high costs and long delays inherent in the court system leave lower-paid employees with few options—the proverbial rickshaw. This article concludes that, while the result of the existing system works for well-off claimants, it does not provide any form of justice for an average claimant. This article suggests that arbitration’s critics reconsider the arbitration process. Properly designed employment arbitration is cheaper and faster than litigation, like the old Saturn automobile (a mid-priced automobile in the 1990s), and, perhaps more importantly, is more accessible to most workers workers.
First Page
319
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197784518.003.0056
Source Publication
Discussions in Dispute Resolution: The Coming of Age (2000–2009)
Source Editors/Authors
Art Hinshaw, Andrea Kupfer, Sarah Rudolph Cole
Publication Date
8-21-2025
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Recommended Citation
Samuel Estreicher,
Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements,
Discussions in Dispute Resolution: The Coming of Age (2000–2009)
319
(2025).
Available at:
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/2168
