Basic and Relational Equality
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Description
Theorists of ‘relational equality’ have defined and elaborated an attractive ideal, which they present as an alternative understanding of equality, superior to distribution-focused theories such as luck-egalitarianism. In my book One Another’s Equals, I presented an understanding of what I called ‘basic equality’, which I also differentiated from distributive theories such as luck-egalitarianism. Does this mean basic equality and relational equality are the same? No. To mangle Euclid, things which are different from the same thing (distributive equality) are not necessarily equal to one another. This chapter explores the differences between basic and relational equality, and shows that ideals like relational equality, important though they are as social ideals, still require basic equality as a foundation.
Source Publication
How Can We Be Equals?: Basic Equality: Its Meaning, Explanation, and Scope
Source Editors/Authors
Giacomo Floris, Nikolas Kirby
Publication Date
2024
Recommended Citation
Waldron, Jeremy, "Basic and Relational Equality" (2024). Faculty Chapters. 2056.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/2056
