The Normative Force of Law: Individuals and States
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Description
After distinguishing some other senses of the “normativity” of law, this chapter addresses its moral force. It is argued that all deontological accounts of a prima facie duty to obey the law, other than the argument from consent, fail for being unable to show that the moral value of law as an institutional order implies a duty to obey each and every legal rule. The argument from consent fails for familiar reasons. This leaves an instrumental account of the moral force of law as the only option. The upshot is that, for individuals, the moral force of law is variable, and often weak. The case is different for state officials, as subjects of either domestic or international law. Here the instrumental case for obedience is typically strong.
Source Publication
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law
Source Editors/Authors
John Gardner, Leslie Green, Brian Leiter
Publication Date
2018
Volume Number
3
Recommended Citation
Murphy, Liam B., "The Normative Force of Law: Individuals and States" (2018). Faculty Chapters. 1979.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/1979
