Political Competition and the Modern VRA
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Description
Political equality is often viewed as one of the central political and constitutional values, or even the central value itself, that explains and justifies democratic self-government. Theorists seek to deduce, from the value of political equality, numerous and varied implications for the way democratic processes should be structured. Much of the constitutional law concerning democratic institutions, such as the malapportionment decisions, are justified in the name of judicially enforcing constitutional commitments to political equality. Some of the most important statutes Congress has enacted, such as the Voting Rights Act (VRA), aim to secure values of political equality in the electoral process and in the design of representative institutions. Yet at the same time, application of overly abstract moral or legal ideals of equality to political processes, or the institutional entrenchment of specific and static understandings of political equality at particular moments in time, can interfere with the complex, dynamic processes through which material power is organized effectively in democratic politics. Constitutional, legislative, and moral understandings of political equality must be understood—as they often are not—in light of the way power is organized and exercised in the actual processes of democratic political competition.
Source Publication
The Future of the Voting Rights Act
Source Editors/Authors
David L. Epstein, Richard H. Pildes, Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Sharyn O'Halloran
Publication Date
2006
Recommended Citation
Pildes, Richard H., "Political Competition and the Modern VRA" (2006). Faculty Chapters. 1960.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/1960
