Distributive Justice and Economic Desert
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Description
What is the relation between distributive justice and desert? According to one familiar view, which many people find intuitively plausible, distributive justice requires that each person be given the economic advantages that he or she deserves, as judged by a standard of individual merit or desert that is prior to and independent of the principles of justice themselves. I will refer to this as the view that justice requires distribution in accordance with ‘prejusticial economic desert’. Notwithstanding the widespread appeal of this view, some prominent contemporary theories of distributive justice reject it. These theories, which I will refer to as ‘non-desert’ theories, deny that justice consists, even in part, in distribution on the basis of prejusticial economic desert. Because the idea of distribution in accordance with economic desert seems intuitively compelling to many people, and because the concept of individual merit or desert plays an important role in our practice of treating one another as responsible agents, non-desert theories are sometimes viewed as being intolerably revisionist in character. In this chapter, however, I will argue that the idea of economic desert—that is, of deserved economic advantages—does not play an indispensable role in moral thought. This means that the important role of desert in other areas of morality does not suffice to rule out a non-desert theory of distributive justice. It is possible to accept such a theory while acknowledging the central role of desert in moral thought and practice. My discussion will be organized as follows. In section 1, I will briefly explain the way in which I take the concept of desert to be implicated in our practice of treating one another as responsible agents. In section 2, I will argue that the specific concept of economic desert does not play a crucial role in that practice, despite the fact that people do make claims of economic desert, and despite the popularity of the view that distributive justice consists in giving people the economic advantages they deserve. In light of this conclusion, I will argue in section 3 that there is room in principle for revisionism about the idea of distribution in accordance with desert. At the same time, I will contrast two types of revisionism in moral philosophy, one of which is more defensible than the other. Whether revisionism about the idea of distribution in accordance with desert is an example of the more defensible type depends on its underlying motivations. I will discuss some of those motivations in section 4. Finally, in section 5, I will explain why a theory of distributive justice that rejects distribution in accordance with desert can nevertheless attach significance to considerations of individual effort and contribution.
Source Publication
Desert and Justice
Source Editors/Authors
Serena Olsaretti
Publication Date
2003
Recommended Citation
Scheffler, Samuel, "Distributive Justice and Economic Desert" (2003). Faculty Chapters. 1783.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/1783
