Temporal Neutrality and the Bias Toward the Future
Files
Description
The conviction that rationality requires an equal concern for all parts of one’s life marks a rare point of agreement among leading Kantian and utilitarian philosophers. John Rawls disagrees with Henry Sidgwick about many things, but the rationality of temporal neutrality is not one of them. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls makes his agreement with Sidgwick on this point explicit. He writes: “In the case of an individual the avoidance of pure time preference is a feature of the rational. As Sidgwick maintains, rationality implies an impartial concern for all parts of our life. The mere difference of location in time, of something’s being earlier or later, is not in itself a rational ground for having more or less regard for it. Of course, a present or near future advantage may be counted more heavily on account of its greater certainty or probability, and we should take into consideration how our situation and capacity for particular enjoyments will change. But none of these things justifies our preferring a lesser present to a greater future good simply because of its nearer temporal position.” Sidgwick, for his part, thinks that the principle “of impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life,” as he calls it, represents a commonsense consensus. He says that an “equal and impartial concern for all parts of one’s conscious life is perhaps the most prominent element in the common notion of the rational—as opposed to the merely impulsive—pursuit of pleasure.” On this last point, at least, Sidgwick was almost certainly mistaken. The principle of impartial concern may sound commonsensical, but most of us have robust preferences that are inconsistent with it. That is one lesson of Derek Parfit’s discussion of temporal bias in Reasons and Persons.
Source Publication
Principles and Persons: The Legacy of Derek Parfit
Source Editors/Authors
Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich, Ketan Ramakrishnan
Publication Date
2021
Recommended Citation
Scheffler, Samuel, "Temporal Neutrality and the Bias Toward the Future" (2021). Faculty Chapters. 1778.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/1778
