Authority for Officials
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Description
In philosophical discussions of authority, we often have in mind a confrontation between an official and a subject. Some ordinary citizen with views of his own about how to behave confronts an official directive which purports to steer him on a path he would not have chosen had he been left to his own devices. Can submission to such directives ever be justified? Joseph Raz's work on authority has consisted in elaborating the conditions that would have to be satisfied, in terms of the subject's reasons for action, before an affirmative answer could be given. However, not all questions of authority are of this type. They do not all involve subjects' responses to directives from officials. This chapter considers authority as between officials or institutions. The principle of institutional settlement is also discussed, along with public settlement, coordination and salience, respect and compliance, pre-emption and dependence, and Raz's normal justification thesis.
Source Publication
Rights, Culture and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz
Source Editors/Authors
Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson, Thomas W. Pogge
Publication Date
2003
Recommended Citation
Waldron, Jeremy, "Authority for Officials" (2003). Faculty Chapters. 1614.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/1614
