Clarity, Thoughtfulness, and the Rule of Law
Files
Description
One form of indeterminacy that is commonly called ‘vagueness’ stems from the use of value predicates like ‘reasonable’ and ‘excessive’ in the law. This indeterminacy is not true vagueness in the philosophical sense, but it is interesting for legal philosophy nonetheless. A case can be made that the use of such predicates represents a distinctive way of guiding action—a mode of guiding action that may be more respectful of intelligent agency than the use of more determinate predicates in legal rules. The use of such predicates allows law to be thoughtful. But the case against using value predicates is that it may be difficult to align or coordinate the self-application of these norms with their secondary application by law enforcement officials and judges. They work best where there is substantial reason to expect such alignment, worst where there is good reason not to.
Source Publication
Vagueness and Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives
Source Editors/Authors
Geert Keil, Ralf Poscher
Publication Date
2016
Recommended Citation
Waldron, Jeremy, "Clarity, Thoughtfulness, and the Rule of Law" (2016). Faculty Chapters. 1547.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/1547
