Democracy in America: A European Perspective on the Millennial Election
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Description
There are still many for whom the basic constitutional structure of the United States is regarded as an attractive model for what the European Union ought to become. The attraction of the United States in this respect is obvious. The political structure established by the U.S. Constitution is perceived as having provided a remarkably stable institutional framework over a span of more than two centuries. During this time, the United States was able to develop from little more than a coalition of rebellious colonies into a global power whose cultural appeal, scientific prowess, economic prosperity, political clout, and military might have few if any historical equals. Most important, the U.S. Constitution as it is understood and interpreted today has established a federal system based on the universally appealing principles of liberty, equality, democracy, and the rule of law—the very principles the European Union professes to be based on. From this point of view, when the presidential election gives rise to intense public debate and a barrage of litigation, ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, important lessons of principle promise to be learned. Given the extensive debates in Europe about how to constitutionally organize democracy on the level of the European Union, such lessons would promise to be both timely and useful. There are a variety of claims that undermine the idea that there is anything of interest that could be learned from looking at the United States generally and the events surrounding the 2000 election specifically. They all have in common that they are based on an exceptionalist account of either American democracy or European constitutionalism. First, there are two kinds of exceptionalist claims focusing on political culture. According to these accounts, nothing can be gained by engaging in a comparative endeavor because American democracy is exceptional. American democracy is sustained by a particular political culture that is unique to the United States and that once again became apparent in all its glory (according to one account) or all its monstrosities (according to another account) during the postelection battles of the last presidential election. Second, there are exceptionalist accounts focusing on the institutional structure of the respective constitutional orders. According to the first, the U.S. electoral system is tied to a highly idiosyncratic, historically contingent, constitutionally entrenched procedure, the study of which could not possibly be helpful to illuminate anything except the quirks of American history. According to the second, the European Union is an entity that should not be thought of as a federal structure, nascent or otherwise, because European integration is a project sui generis, whose specific features are not appropriately understood when grafted on to a federalist conceptual map. In the following I briefly describe these positions in greater detail. As will become clear, the 2000 election has thrown light on some basic features of constitutional democracy in federal systems that challenge widely held views about U.S. constitutionalism and undermine exceptionalist accounts of European constitutionalism. As the responses to the election indicate, it is no longer obvious whether the conception of constitutionalism that underlies American constitutionalism today should be conceived as a federal one properly understood, whereas there are no such grounds for doubt on the level of the European Union.
Source Publication
The Longest Night: Polemics and Perspectives on Election 2000
Source Editors/Authors
Arthur J. Jacobson, Michel Rosenfeld
Publication Date
2002
Recommended Citation
Kumm, Mattias, "Democracy in America: A European Perspective on the Millennial Election" (2002). Faculty Chapters. 1344.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/1344
