The Efficiency Paradox
Files
Description
This paper defines various concepts of efficiency and then demonstrates how conservative economic approaches have led to wrong results in several important cases. It asks: What is efficiency? Can antitrust law produce efficiency, and how does it try to do so? It observes that one way antitrust pursues efficiency is by choosing a proxy; notably, either trust in the dynamic of the competition process or trust in (even) the dominant firm. By case examples, it shows the effect of conservative economics in choosing as the proxy trust in the dominant firm. It argues that this phenomenon has produced the Efficiency Paradox: In the name of efficiency, conservative theories of antitrust cut off the most promising paths to efficiency. It is suggested that we can eliminate the Efficiency Paradox by readjusting the pendulum to give more regard to the incentives of mavericks and challengers and less regard to the freedom and autonomy of dominant firms.
Source Publication
How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust
Source Editors/Authors
Robert Pitofsky
Publication Date
2008
Recommended Citation
Fox, Eleanor M., "The Efficiency Paradox" (2008). Faculty Chapters. 1235.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/1235
