On the Foundation of Antitrust Law and Economics
Files
Description
This paper suggests that while the influence of industrial organization economics has grown substantially over time, it would be overly simplistic to characterize that influence as having been driven solely by a group of conservative antitrust legal and/or economic scholars. Differences among antitrust economists are as likely due to the fact economists hold a range of views as to the meaning of economic efficiency, and they differ significantly in their beliefs as to the likely efficacy of government intervention. The paper begins with an overview of the history of antitrust policy. It explains how important precedents in the law have followed, albeit with a substantial lag, important developments in the economics of industrial organization that serve as important underpinnings of the law. It then explains why and how economists' views of antitrust policy differ, and how and why conservative economics has overshot the mark to some degree.
Source Publication
How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust
Source Editors/Authors
Robert Pitofsky
Publication Date
2008
Recommended Citation
Rubinfeld, Daniel L., "On the Foundation of Antitrust Law and Economics" (2008). Faculty Chapters. 1234.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/1234
