Procedure for the Resolution of Price-Anderson Claims
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Description
Congress directed the Commission to consider whether cases arising under the Act should be managed administratively or judicially and to develop procedures for handling claims. This chapter responds to that direction and proposes a plan for deciding Price- Anderson cases that the Commission believes is equitable and efficient, that will enjoy a high degree of public acceptance, that will keep transaction costs low, and that bases recovery on the best medical and scientific information available. The Commission began its deliberations by examining a hypothetical large nuclear occurrence giving rise to significant numbers of cases, involving substantial issues. It then identified the areas that would, under any compensation system procedure, require attention. These are: provision for emergency payments, initiation of suits (filing and registration issues), consolidation of cases (venue and choice of law issues), generic determinations (use of scientific expertise), resolution of individual actions, determination of compensation for nonpecuniary injuries, and resolution of punitive damage claims. Focusing on this list, the Commission next reviewed the experience that the tort system has encountered in mass accident cases. It found that although the current legal rules have been shown to be flexible, judicial disposition of large-scale cases has been costly and protracted. Furthermore, the techniques that have worked in the past may be less available in the Price-Anderson context than they have been in others. For example, while the class action has often proved to be a valuable tool for settling mass accident cases, this device may be of limited use here. Many nuclear claims will be large in relation to the transaction costs of proceeding individually. At least for those accidents declared to be ENOs, technically complex and expensive proof of causation and fault will not be required. Furthermore, the interim payment features of the statute provide relief to parties while they pursue their rights. Accordingly, these claimants may not need to pool their resources by joining a class. By the same token, because the Act was designed to remove fears of insolvency, bankruptcy—another avenue by which several mass torts have been resolved—may likewise be unavailing. Nonetheless, based on the testimony presented, the Commission reasoned that a judicial approach to the Act is likely to enjoy greater credibility and public acceptance than an administrative model. Accordingly, it developed a procedure for distributing Price-Anderson funds that utilizes some of the efficiency and cost-containing features of administrative adjudication, but placed it within a judicial framework. This chapter is in three sections. The first describes the distribution plan recommended by the Commission and the amendments to the Act required for its implementation. This section should be read in conjunction with the second, which describes the alternative procedures considered and the reasons underlying the choices made. The third section proceeds from a different perspective; under the assumption that the Act might not be amended, it traces the extent to which the Commission's plan could be implemented under existing law.
Source Publication
Report to the Congress from the Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents
Source Editors/Authors
United States Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents
Publication Date
1990
Volume Number
1
Recommended Citation
Dreyfuss, Rochelle C., "Procedure for the Resolution of Price-Anderson Claims" (1990). Faculty Chapters. 1202.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-chapt/1202
