A Theory of Reasons for Action
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Description
This work is an attempt to offer, in an exploratory and constructive spirit, a systematic account of the concept, reasons for action. The main thesis of this study is that there exists an adequate and true theory of the meaning of sentences using ‘reasons for action’ and related terminology—a theory which analyses or elucidates their meaning in terms of certain propositions (which may be truly or falsely asserted), which provided an account of the use of these sentences in performing various acts by speech (e.g. advising), and which clarifies the moving appeal to action which the utterance of these sentences often, or typically, has. Coherent with this general thesis, the work has the theoretical objective of presenting a plausible (not necessarily a true) formulation of such a theory, so that at least some good constructive reasons will have been giving for others to work further in developing a more accurate expression of the truth which is here perhaps only dimly perceived and incoherently expressed. Consonant with the book’s general thesis and theoretical objective, an attempt is made to formulate a structure of principles which will account for reasons for action associated with the concept of rationality (Prat I) and with the concept of morality (Part II). In both parts of the book, the same constructive pattern of argument is systematically applied. First, principles are formulated and explained. Secondly, an attempt is made to show how these principles clarify propositions which certain ‘ought’, ‘under and obligation’, ‘there is good reason’, etc., sentences express. Thirdly, an explanation is sketched regarding how the propositional account elucidates the use of these sentences in accomplishing the various characteristic speech acts that they do accomplish. And fourthly, an attempt is made to explain and clarify the moving appeal to action which the utterance of these sentences typically possess. Throughout, the orientation of this work is tentative and exploratory. No claims to finality or conclusiveness are made. Rather, a general approach to doing normative philosophy is suggested , one which re-examines and questions the fruitfulness of sharp divisions between analytic and substantive inquiries. The reader is invited to consider whether and how this approach may be usefully developed further.
Publication Date
1971
Recommended Citation
Richards, David A.J., "A Theory of Reasons for Action" (1971). Faculty Books & Edited Works. 585.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-books-edited-works/585
