Document Type
Article
Publication Title
University of Chicago Law Review
Abstract
This article reports that bundling and tying arrangements are widespread in the U.S. economy. These practices have come under scrutiny by the courts, which have on occasion concluded that particular arrangements are anticompetitive. One particular form of bundling, the bundling of rebates, has received a great deal of attention recently in light of the jury's decision and the ensuing en banc opinion by the Third Circuit in LePage's Inc. v Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3M). This article analyzes the bundled rebate programs that were among the monopolizing practices asserted by LePage's. It focuses on the jury's finding of liability against 3M in order to critique the current tests evaluating whether bundling is procompetitive or anticompetitive.
First Page
243
Volume
72
Publication Date
2005
Recommended Citation
Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
3M's Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective,
72
University of Chicago Law Review
243
(2005).
Available at:
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-articles/982
