Meeting by Signals, Playing by Norms: Complementary Accounts of Nonlegal Cooperation in Institutions
Document Type
Article
Publication Title
University of Richmond Law Review
Abstract
This Essay on Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms examines the extent to which signaling theory can provide a model for understanding non-legally enforced cooperation within institutions. After reviewing the signaling model upon which Posner's book is based, we take the employment relationship in firms as a case study. We argue that while signaling theory may be useful in explaining the formation of that relationship, it does not provide a basis for understanding its observed regularities, or of the very limited role played by the legal rules in rendering the relationship incentive compatible. We conclude that our analysis and Posner's focus on different aspects of similar phenomena and are complementary rather than competing theories.
First Page
423
Volume
36
Publication Date
2002
Recommended Citation
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
Meeting by Signals, Playing by Norms: Complementary Accounts of Nonlegal Cooperation in Institutions,
36
University of Richmond Law Review
423
(2002).
Available at:
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-articles/965
