Document Type
Article
Publication Title
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
Abstract
The central purpose of this Article, particularly in light of my prior work, is to refocus the attention of federal environmental regulation. Of the two most prominent reasons for vesting responsibility for environmental regulation at the federal level, the race-tothe- bottom rationale is analytically unsound, despite the fact that much of the legal regime is structured to redress this asserted evil. In contrast, the rationale for federal regulation premised on the problem of interstate externalities is analytically unimpeachable but has not been effectively redressed in the current pollution- control scheme. At a time when federal environmental regulation is under fierce political attack, it is critical to define clearly what tasks can best be accomplished at the federal level and to ensure that the resulting regulatory scheme in fact accomplishes those tasks. This Article shows why a great deal more attention needs to be paid to fashioning an effective federal response to the problem of interstate externalities.
First Page
2341
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2307/3312672
Volume
144
Publication Date
1996
Recommended Citation
Richard L. Revesz,
Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities,
144
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
2341
(1996).
Available at:
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-articles/932
