Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Hofstra Law Review

Abstract

There is thus a wide degree of debate in the literature about the degree to which social norms reflect spontaneous private ordering. Despite the disagreement, however, the literature to date has not recognized a key feature of many social norms: Social norms can-and often do-function as means by which members of interest groups acquire benefits for their members. This concept requires elaboration, and will be discussed at length in the pages that follow. The basic intuition is simple, however: by manipulating social norms, groups can enrich themselves-either monetarily or by obtaining non-pecuniary benefits such as esteem or deference-at the expense of other groups and sometimes of the society as a whole. To the extent that they function as means by which group members acquire benefits, social norms are similar to legislation, regulation, and other types of government action. Accordingly, the theory of public choice, which attempts to explain activities in the political arena, may provide a means for understanding the operation of a wide variety of social norms. This Article examines social norms from the perspective of public choice theory. Part I places norms in a framework of social control. It sets out a typology of norms and identifies one category, which I refer to as "competitive norms," as being relevant to analysis from a public choice perspective. Part II discusses the processes that can result in competitive norms being dissipated or lost. Part III addresses the efficiency of competitive norms. This Article ends with a brief conclusion.

First Page

637

Volume

32

Publication Date

2003

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