Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Abstract

In this essay, I propose to take legal reasoning seriously. I focus on a limited aspect of the practice of precedent, often called stare decisis. In section II, I frame the problem in two respects. First, I sketch the substantive contours of a practice that, paradoxically, demands that a court adhere to a prior decision it believes wrong. Second, I suggest that justifications for stare decisis may vary with the institutional framework. Section III explicates the idea of a "wrongly decided" case. In section IV, I survey, from an economic perspective, jurisprudential justifications for the practice. Each of the final two sections offers a heuristic model of the practice of stare decisis. Each model focuses on a distinct source of error identified in section III. In the first model, I explore "reliance" justifications grounded on errors resulting from "legal uncertainty." In the second model, I examine similar justifications grounded on errors resulting from uncertainty about the world. These models, I believe, highlight the difficulty of justifying stare decisis when one makes precise both the practice and the institutional context in which it occurs.

First Page

63

Volume

65

Publication Date

1989

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