Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Boston University Law Review

Abstract

In their article, Anticipating Venezuela’s Debt Crisis: Hidden Holdouts and the Problem of Pricing Collective Action Clauses, Professors Bob Scott, Steve Choi, and Mitu Gulati present a pathbreaking empirical study of Venezuelan bonds. They find that enforcement rights, taken on their own, have much less of a price impact than one would have assumed. Rather, they identify “contract arbitrageurs”—typically activist hedge funds—as an important link between enforcement rights and bond prices. In my view, Scott, Choi, and Gulati’s assessment is essentially correct. So, I will use this Comment to expound on the differences between collective and unilateral rights and their expected price impact from a more theoretical perspective and then examine their empirical results in light of these differences.

First Page

341

Volume

100

Publication Date

2020

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