Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Abstract

In this Article, I suggest that one particular doctrine of local government law that initially appears inconsistent with liberal conceptions of local autonomy may actually increase the likelihood that a given locality will supply those goods and services preferred by its residents. I argue that the doctrine at issue, Dillon's Rule, can best be understood and justified as a judicial check on local tendencies to cater to special interests at the expense of other groups within the locality. For those who consider local autonomy to be unnecessarily constrained, Dillon's Rule is anathema. If my view of the Rule is correct, however, then Dillon's Rule may be vital in ensuring that localities satisfy the objectives of their residents. Typically, special interests will constitute a minority of the locality, so that satisfaction of their demands is likely to deviate from the aggregate preferences of the community. If Dillon's Rule creates an obstacle for these interests, therefore, it may enhance the ability of a majority of municipal residents to achieve their preferences. Nor is there anything implicit in Dillon's Rule that requires that those preferences be taken as given; the Rule does nothing to frustrate and perhaps provides some mechanism to achieve informed preferences that presumably evolve from robust public debate. Indeed, my strongest claim is that, given the current structure of local decision-making, informed residents would prefer the doctrine that has emerged.

First Page

959

Volume

67

Publication Date

1991

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