Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Vanderbilt Law Review

Abstract

This article develops a more convincing rationale for Teague than that provided by the Court but nonetheless concludes the Court erred seriously in deciding as it did. Part II of this Article describes the rule and impact of the Teague cases and criticizes the disingenuous road the Court took to its decision. Part III offers an alternative explanation for Teague. This part explains that just as the Supreme Court created habeas corpus jurisdiction for the very purpose of expanding and protecting due process rights, so the Court may constrict the availability of the writ if it perceives that the job of expanding rights is completed. Part IV analyzes the hubris of a Court so confident that due process has been defined properly for all time, or even this time, that it is willing to slam shut the doors of habeas courts. This part criticizes the Court's vision of a criminal justice system devoted solely to determining guilt or innocence, and challenges the Court's assumption that even in the realm of guilt and innocence we know all there is to be known. Part V discusses the inevitable "fall" such hubris will precipitate, speculating that there will come a time when future Courts will need habeas courts again, as they once were needed, and will find it difficult to rehabilitate this now-discredited voice in the dialogue of rights-definition.

First Page

797

Volume

45

Publication Date

1992

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