Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

Abstract

This paper is about comparative institutional design of competition law and policy systems, and the relationship of design to context. It is also about design and change. Jurisdictions need sound and thoughtful institutional design that will best help to advance their competition law and policy, and do so with transparency, fairness, and due process. Many designs may achieve these ends. This paper is not about available choices or global models. Rather, albeit selectively and anecdotally, it concerns the design choices that nations make. The paper has two parts. Part II refers principally to the initial choice of design. It reflects how design choices are driven by context. Part III is about changes in design: how change does or does not happen; and what forces triggered change in the past, both radical and instrumental, and thus may be likely to do so in the future. Both parts observe that choices are driven not only by logic but also by politics and political and economic context. Part III observes also that, when initial designs reveal flaws or their logic or fit is outgrown, systems with wise leadership tend to adapt the system to the demands of the time. Systems (through good leaders) may rise to the occasion. They are especially likely to do so in the global and Internet economy, in which sunlight is abundant, flaws are often transparent, international watchdogs constantly evaluate comparative performance, and the individuals who lead the competition authorities have incentives not only to be among the “best” but also to be so perceived.

First Page

473

Volume

41

Publication Date

2010

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