Document Type
Article
Publication Title
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper Series
Abstract
On September 17, 2007, the European Court of First Instance decided Microsoft's appeal of the European Commission's 2004 decision finding that Microsoft had violated Article 82 of the EC Treaty by failing to provide certain interoperability information to Sun Microsystems and by refusing to dis-integrate Windows and the Windows Media Player. In this short comment I review the CFI's decision, focusing on three ways in which the decision properly stiffens the strong spine of European competition law - its treatment of intellectual property, tying, and leveraging. The comment also discusses the EC's remedy orders in Microsoft, which I argue reveal the soft underbelly of European competition law, a soft underbelly that the European Microsoft case shares with the U.S. Microsoft settlement.
Volume
Working paper No.08-17
Publication Date
2008
Recommended Citation
First, Harry, "Strong Spine, Weak Underbelly: The CFI Microsoft Decision" (2008). Faculty Articles. 386.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-articles/386
