Document Type
Article
Publication Title
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law
Abstract
Barry Friedman has made an important contribution in exploring the nature of American democracy and the evolving role of the Supreme Court in that democracy. His idea—that the Court has effectively encouraged public argument and deliberation—is provocative because he has offered powerful historical evidence to support it. But it also provokes a rethinking of the character of American democracy itself by seeing countermajoritarian courts as enhancing its deliberative aspects. We are fairly confidant that Friedman would rush to qualify this statement, acknowledging that on some particular issues and for some period of time, either popular or legislative majorities are prevented from choosing policies they want. But he would also insist that in the sweep of history, these interludes are fairly short, however painful they may seem at the time. On the whole, then, we have a policy-making process that stays roughly in step with public opinion over the medium or long run where constitutional issues come to inform popular debates and deliberations about policy.
First Page
353
Volume
13
Publication Date
2010
Recommended Citation
Ferejohn, John A. and Pasquino, Pasquale, "The Countermajoritarian Opportunity" (2010). Faculty Articles. 363.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-articles/363
