Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Cornell Law Review

Abstract

Our provisional view, expressed in Part I, is that cognitive psychology, in its current state of development, is best deployed as a critical theory which supplements our understanding of the operation of interest group pressure, institutional interaction, and the process of policy debate and deliberation. At this point, cognitive psychology does not constitute a new descriptive theory of the regulatory state, nor does it have any particular normative contribution beyond banally observing that rational actors better advance their goals by making accurate rather than biased judgments. Currently, cognitive psychology does not even constitute a body of learning telling us what agents will do; it only tells us that agents will fall short of whatever it is they vate groups without any public-regarding justification. This is a relatively cynical view of government, and that cynicism has been a big hit with academics and the general population alike in the last forty years. We believe that the underlying reason for this popularity is that, since 1960, the American people have become increasingly distrustful of others generally, with that generic distrust pervasively affecting their views of the government. If this trend continues (and there is every reason to think that it will), public choice theory will be a permanent part of our intellectual landscape.

First Page

616

Volume

87

Publication Date

2002

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