Document Type
Article
Publication Title
John Marshall Law Review
Abstract
The basic argument I have made in favor of discrimination in employment markets is: when large numbers of employers who are in competition with one another, society does not have to worry about the irrationality or stupidity of any individual employee or employer. Instead, society must ask itself how the least irrational employer would respond to the requests of workers in disfavored groups. The reason is clear enough. A majority vote is not required to get a job in an open market. People normally do not expect to find employment with employers who are hostile to their aims and ambitions. Yet, as long as there is any variation in taste, the inclinations of the hostile group do not matter because these groups can pair themselves up with employers who have favorable sentiments. Thus, if ninety percent of the market is absolutely irrational and crazy, people who have the qualities of mind, the temperament and the work ability which allows them to succeed in the workplace can seek employment with the remaining ten percent. The long term consequences are even more favorable. If the ten percent of the employers willing to put prejudice aside get better workers for a lower price than the rival irrational firms, they will be able to expand their market share and, thus, create more opportunities for the disadvantaged workers who are left behind. The process of equilibration in markets strongly favors disadvantaged workers.
First Page
575
Volume
29
Publication Date
1996
Recommended Citation
Epstein, Richard A., "The Subtle Vices of the Employment Discrimination Laws" (1996). Faculty Articles. 283.
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-articles/283
