Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Stanford Law & Policy Review

Abstract

In a short introduction, I shall not even attempt to hint at my views on this cluster of issues, which are on most issues very much a work-in-progress. As a committed defender of limited government in the classical liberal tradition, there are many areas of human life in which I would like to keep the government at bay. I see little or no reason for state regulation of employment contracts for example, and I cautiously accept only limited forms of land planning. But neither of those strategies works here, for try as one might, intelligence is a legitimate government function—assuming that we have any government at all. At this point, I have no particular point of privilege over the rest of the pack in promoting small government solutions. Like everyone else I have to work through a field that is beset with serious questions: What is the scope of its basic mission? What is the appropriate institutional design to carry that mission out? And, what is the best way to integrate the work of the intelligence system with that of the criminal justice system in ways that have a fair shot at preserving liberty while promoting security? It is an open question whether anyone shall be able to propose any long-term solution that will command universal consent on a matter so fraught with difficulty. But now that we are in our season of open discontent, we must take the risk of public discourse on these knotty problems of statecraft. No longer can we take the posture of that great philosophical muse, David Hume, who concluded after deep reflection that “carelessness and inattention” afford the only solutions to the most tenacious problems of the day. Today, the stakes are too high for ignorance to be our institutional response to matters of intelligence.

First Page

233

Volume

17

Publication Date

2006

Download

Share

COinS