Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Michigan Journal of International Law

Abstract

This article reexamines recent U.S. withholdings of its assessed regular contributions to the UN, as well as the premises and assumptions underlying the theory that a UN member may legally and unilaterally withhold payments for ultra vires acts by the organization. The issue is of considerable consequence since, despite recent rhetoric, the number of members financially supporting the UN through timely payments of regular contributions number only about half the membership, while many members selectively withhold portions of their payments. These practices undermine the basic doctrine of "collective financial responsibility" and threaten the survival of international organizations. Reexamination is timely since the lessening of ideological divisions at the UN may facilitate adoption of legal remedies to the a la carte payment problem. Part I of this article surveys recent U.S. withholdings in the context of U.S. policy goals. Parts II(A) and (B) criticize the "tyranny of the majority" justification for unilateral withholdings in the case of alleged ultra vires acts, an approach whose dangers are reflected in the United States' a la carte approach towards the UN. Part II(C) proposes an alternative approach to the ultra vires problem less susceptible to self-serving unilateral financial withholdings by member States. Part III briefly canvasses possible legal remedies, assuming assessed UN contributions are considered debts legally owing.

First Page

229

Volume

12

Publication Date

1991

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