Document Type

Article

Publication Title

University of Miami Law Review

Abstract

The discussion at the Conference, and the papers written in connection with it, raise many issues on which it seems appropriate for me to comment in closing. It is quite impossible to give a detailed response to each individual objection or to each author, so I plan instead to discuss only the most critical questions here. For ease of exposition I divide my remarks into two classes. In the first part, I examine criticism of my point of view as a matter of political theory. In the second part, I look at some of the more particular challenges to my legal and constitutional position. The division is necessary for it is quite clear that matters of political theory and political thought are not hemmed in by any authoritative text or by received canons of interpretation that are applicable to constitutional discourse. Political theory is reasoning to the eminent domain clause; constitutional interpretation is reasoning from it. Nonetheless, the eminent domain clause does lay strong claims to articulating a coherent normative view of the legal order, so that the distinction between political theory and constitutional interpretation is not as watertight as the above opposition suggests. Nonetheless, it offers a convenient first approximation around which to organize the analysis. Part one therefore deals with the relationship between natural rights and utilitarianism. Part two then turns to more concrete issues of constitutional interpretation.

First Page

253

Volume

41

Publication Date

1986

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