Document Type

Article

Publication Title

UC Davis Law Review

Abstract

This Article responds to a little-noticed aspect of the reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London: the renewed discussion that the case has prompted about how much compensation governments should pay when they take people's homes through eminent domain. Since Kelo, there have been many proposals to increase the compensation that governments pay when they take property. These proposals aim to deter government takings by increasing the costs of takings, and to more fully compensate takees for their losses. This Article argues that the debate about eminent domain compensation is being conducted within too narrow a framework because many of the proposed reforms start from the same problematic assumption. Specifically, many of the proposals assume that takings compensation ideally should leave takees subjectively indifferent to takings. This Article critiques that assumption and argues that takings compensation should aim to leave takees objectively indifferent to takings. The Article also sketches an objective compensation measure that contrasts with the subjective ideal underlying existing takings compensation law and many current reform proposals.

First Page

239

Volume

41

Publication Date

2007

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