Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

Abstract

The article explores the role of the jury and the restraining hand of the expert in capital sentencing procedures in Texas. The moral, social and legal judgment made by a jury deciding the appropriateness of a death sentence is much like that of a jury deciding the culpability of a defendant who raises an insanity defense. It has been determined that in view of the complicated nature of the decision to be made the insanity defense is peculiarly apt for resolution by the jury. And, it has been required that trial judges and appellate judges ensure that the jury base its decision on the behavioral data which are relevant to a determination of blameworthiness, rather than the conclusions and classifications of experts. Conclusory psychiatric testimony has also been found to inhibit intelligent decision-making where civil commitment is authorized for the dangerous. It is also significant that in the insanity defense context, the diagnosis of sociopath is increasingly thought to present a challenge to the presumption of responsibility which only the jury may resolve. Yet, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has met the charge that psychiatric testimony of the kind typically used by the state in capital sentencings was speculative and constituted an invasion of the province of the jury with the response that the judge, on the basis of common knowledge, impliedly found that the behavior patterns of a sociopath were beyond the knowledge of laymen and that the witness' knowledge and experience in this field would assist the jury. The evidence was properly admitted. The court did not consider the relevancy of sociopathy to the questions before the jury, nor did it exhibit any inclination to articulate standards to assure that the expert testimony would inform rather than dictate the judgment.

First Page

300

DOI

https://doi.org/10.2307/1142324

Volume

69

Publication Date

1978

Download

Share

COinS