Document Type
Article
Publication Title
University of Chicago Law Review
Abstract
Accordingly, the conclusion that private parties can respond to the Delaware Court's adoption of "just say no" does not imply that "just say no" did not significantly reduce shareholder welfare. The doctrine leaves shareholders vulnerable to unpredictable strategic board action, in ways the parties cannot adequately redress through private arrangements. Even with private solutions it remains to be considered whether Delaware courts potentially could improve shareholder welfare by altering Delawaie antitakeover law to limit the scope of antitakeover defenses. Thus, while private agreements must be taken into account, they do not necessarily replace the need for legal intervention in this area.
First Page
917
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2307/1600635
Volume
69
Publication Date
2002
Recommended Citation
Jennifer H. Arlen,
Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies,
69
University of Chicago Law Review
917
(2002).
Available at:
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-articles/1308
