Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
Abstract
In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren ruled that police officers may "stop-and-frisk" people whom they have reasonable suspicion to believe are armed and dangerous. The reasonable suspicion standard was an exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement, one that the Chief Justice maintained would be narrowly tailored to circumstances under which police officers fear for their safety or the safety of others. Over the past forty years, that exception has metastasized across Fourth Amendment law, beyond the Terry stop-and-frisk context, to justify a range of governmental intrusions. This Article describes that development. In particular, the Article highlights a demeaning and intrusive practice that reasonable suspicion now authorizes at the United States border. There, the Court allows governmental officials to mobilize reasonable suspicion to subject people not simply to stop-and-frisk, but to a more invasive form of search and seizure fairly termed "stop-and-strip violence."
First Page
467
Volume
55
Publication Date
2020
Recommended Citation
Devon W. Carbado,
Stop-and-Strip Violence: The Doctrinal Migrations of Reasonable Suspicion,
55
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
467
(2020).
Available at:
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-articles/1218
