Document Type
Article
Publication Title
University of Chicago Law Review
Abstract
Madison identified the problem of factional domination in territorially limited government. The growth of the national regulatory welfare state, however, has spawned a new form of factional domination. By an irony of inversion, Madison's centralizing solution to the problem of faction has produced Madison's Nightmare: a faction-ridden maze of fragmented and often irresponsible micropolitics within the government. The post-New Deal constitutional jurisprudence of majoritarian politics has helped produce this result, because the demands for national regulatory and spending programs have outstripped the capacity of the national legislative process to make decisions that are accountable and politically responsive to the general interest. This has subverted the very premises of Madisonian politics.
First Page
335
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2307/1599949
Volume
57
Publication Date
1990
Recommended Citation
Richard B. Stewart,
Madison's Nightmare,
57
University of Chicago Law Review
335
(1990).
Available at:
https://gretchen.law.nyu.edu/fac-articles/1121
