Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Hofstra Law Review

Abstract

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague invites the conclusion that the federal system is unable to protect itself against state parochialism in the choice-of-law process. By effectively rejecting the possibility of constitutional constraints in conflicts cases, the Court appears to have left itself and the federal system defenseless. The result is at sharp odds with the Court's recent ventures in the field of personal jurisdiction, where it has relied on the principles of fairness and the bounded reach of state sovereignty to fashion limitations on the extensions of a state's legal process. Hague presents conflict-of-laws theorists with something of a dilemma. There is little doubt that the decision of the Minnesota court to apply its own law was wrong, and would be condemned by most choice-of-law theories. At the same time, there is a widely shared sense that the constitutionalization of the choice-of-law process is unjustified given the paucity of principles which can legitimately be mined from the Constitution, and undesirable in light of the federal rigidity which would be introduced into state common law processes. I believe that the convergence of choice-of-law analyses over the facts of Hague reflects an important principle which ought to restrain states in a federal legal system. Moreover, I believe that basic choice-of-law limitations can and should be imposed upon the states as a matter of federal law, and that the drawbacks of enshrining these limitations in the Constitution can be avoided by placing them on a common law footing.

First Page

103

Volume

10

Publication Date

1981

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